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MULTI–PARTY PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND:
REPRESENTATIVE AND GROUP ACTIONS
NEIL ANDREWS*
I.  INTRODUCTION
In July 2000 the Duke University School of Law and the Faculty of
Law of the University of Geneva held an excellent conference in Ge-
neva entitled “Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspec-
tives.”  The conference focused on comparing and contrasting class ac-
tions with multi–party proceedings.  The present paper has been revised
in light of that stimulating discussion.
This text begins by considering the relatively undeveloped system
of English representative proceedings (Section II).  That system is the
English version of a class action.  The development of representative
proceedings has been retarded by the courts’ general inability, save in
unusual situations, to award damages on behalf of a represented class of
claimants.  After a short mention of consolidated proceedings (Section
III), discussion will turn to Group Litigation Orders (Section IV).  In
2000, new provisions appeared which governed English group actions,
i.e., civil proceedings to which large numbers of parties can accede in
pursuing claims or defenses.1  As we shall see, coordinated group ac-
tions are really intended to act as a surrogate for a mature system of
class actions.  Group actions are different from class actions because
each group litigant is a member of a procedural class as a party, rather
than as a represented non–party.  Section V of the paper contains a se-
ries of comparisons between representative and group proceedings.
Through these comparisons, I have attempted to distill the thoughts
stirred by the discussion at the Geneva conference.
Copyright  2001 by Neil Andrews.
* M.A., B.C.L., Barrister, Fellow, Clare College, Cambridge, United Kingdom, Fountain
Court Chambers, Temple, London.
1. See CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES [CIV. P. R.] 19.0.10–19.15 (U.K.).
ANDREWS.DOC 07/10/01  8:51 AM
250 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 11:249
II.  REPRESENTATIVE PROCEEDINGS
A. Representative Proceedings in Outline
In England, a party representing others can sue to vindicate not
only his personal interest but also the rights of those who are similarly
affected by a defendant’s breach of duty.  This is the representative ac-
tion, which has a long history.2  A representative action can take three
forms: an active form, when it is claimant–led; a passive form, when the
represented group consists of various potential wrongdoers or debtors;
or a combined active and passive form.  Of these three forms, the most
important is the active representative claim.
B. The Main Rule
Rule 19.6 of the 1998 Civil Procedure Rules adopts, with slight
modification, the rule which appeared in the Rules of the Supreme
Court and in the County Court Rules (both of these latter sets of rules
have been phased out over the last year or more).3  The rule now pro-
vides the following:
(1) Where more than one person has the same interest in a claim
a. the claim may be begun; or
b. the court may order that the claim be continued, by or
against one or more of the persons who have the same in-
terest as representatives of any other persons who have
that interest.
(2) The court may direct that a person may not act as a representa-
tive.
(3) Any party may apply to the court for an order under paragraph
(2).
(4) Unless the court otherwise directs any judgment or order given
in a claim in which a party is acting as a representative under
this rule
a. is binding on all persons represented in the claim; but
b. may only be enforced by or against a person who is not a
party to the claim with the permission of the court.4
2. See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION tO tHE
MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987).
3. See CIV. P. R. 19.6 (repealing the former rules RSC O. 15, r. 12(1), CCR O.5, r. 5(1)).
4. Id.
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C. Aspects of Representative Proceedings
1. Need for a Common Interest.  A representative cannot use
this procedure to make a claim if he does not have a cause of action in
his own right.5  For example, the Court of Appeal recently declared
that an action could not proceed in representative form because it
was improperly constituted.6  The case concerned a trade association’s
complaint that the defendant had committed the tort of misrepre-
senting its product as Swiss chocolate.7  The court held that the asso-
ciation lacked capacity to sue on behalf of affected Swiss traders be-
cause its own interests had not been damaged by the wrong.8
Furthermore, Rule 19.6 clearly explains that the interest which un-
derlies the representative’s cause of action must be the same as that
of the represented parties.9  In other words, they must all be common
victims.
2. No Need for Judicial Permission or Nomination.  Represen-
tative proceedings can begin without the court’s permission.  By con-
trast, such permission is required to make a group litigation order un-
der the English rule.10  The court’s permission is also necessary to
continue a derivative action.11  Such permission must be obtained
once the derivative action has been formally commenced by issue of a
claim form.12  Also, the representative does not need to be appointed
or elected by the relevant group.13  He can be a self–appointed gen-
eral.
3. The Position of the Represented Persons.  It is unnecessary
for the represented persons to be informed of the intention to bring
the representative action or of the action’s progress.  Furthermore,
the representative claimant or defendant is dominus litis (“the one
5. See id.
6. See Trade Association Cannot Sue Over Passing–Off, THE TIMES, Mar. 15, 1999,  (ex-
amining RSC O. 15, r. 12(1) (now CIV. P. R. 19.6(1)) and the Court of Appeal decision in Cho-
cosuisse Union des Fabricants Suisses de Chocolat v. Cadbury Ltd. “[w]here more than one per-
son has the same interest in a claim . . .”); see discussion infra Section II.D.2 (regarding payment
by professional organizations of class action cost).
7. See Trade Association Cannot Sue Over Passing–Off, supra note 6.
8. See id.
9. See CIV. P. R. 19.6.
10. See CIV. P. R. 19.11; discussion infra Section IV.
11. See id. at 19.9.
12. See id.
13. See Neil Andrews, Principles of Civil Procedure, ¶ 7-026 (1994).
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who calls the procedural shots”) which means the representative can
compromise the claim or defense single–handedly.  It might seem that
the represented group is subject to the representative’s dominion.
However, it is possible for members of the represented group to re-
bel, secede, and become co–defendants if they are discontent with the
manner in which the representative is conducting the proceedings.14
4. Settlement.  The court normally does not need to monitor or
approve settlements reached through representative proceedings.
The exception, which is consistent with general principles, concerns
judicial approval of settlements affecting a represented party who is
either suffering a mental disability or is a minor (i.e., under 18 years
of age).15  The court’s inherent jurisdiction might be invoked in the fu-
ture to deal with a situation where a representative proposes settling
the case on terms which are regarded as disadvantageous, prejudicial,
or unattractive to represented persons who have not been fully con-
sulted.16
5. Judicial Control at the Stage of Enforcement.  Another source
of protection for the represented person’s interest develops if he is
subject to a representative action brought against a representative de-
fendant.  In this situation, which concerns the passive form of repre-
sentative actions, the represented person can seek fuller considera-
tion of his particular position before the relevant judgment is
enforced against him.  Thus, the rule provides:
(4) Unless the court otherwise directs any judgment or order given
in a claim in which a party is acting as a representative under
this rule . . .
b. may only be enforced by or against a person who is not a
party to the claim with the permission of the court.17
The same rule, it should be noted, entitles a party who is represented
by a claimant to sue on the relevant judgment, but only with the
court’s permission.18]
14. See ANDREWS, supra note 13, at 144-45, ¶ 7-011 (considering, notably, John v. Rees, 2
W.L.R. 1294 (Ch. 1970)).
15. See CIV. P. R. 21.10(1).
16. See ANDREWS, supra note 14, at ¶ 1-003 (commenting on inherent jurisdiction); see gener-
ally SIR JACK JACOB, THE REFORM OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL LAW (1982); M. S. Dockray, The In-
herent Juridiction to Regulate Civil Proceedings, 113 L.Q.R. 120 (1997); M. S. Dockray, Note, Re-
straint Orders, 107 L.Q.R. 376 (1991) (criticizing this phenomenon’s amorphous nature); J.A.
Jolowicz, Practice Directions and the Civil Procedure Rules, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 53, 53 n.1 (2000)
(citing additional discussions of inherent jurisdiction).
17. CIV. P. R. 19.6(4)(b).
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D. The Question of Damages
1. No Award of Damages at Large.  Damages cannot be
awarded at large or globally without reference to the particular loss
suffered by members of the relevant class of interested persons.  This
is the nub of the matter and the reason why the English representa-
tive action remains a procedural backwater rather than a flourishing
style of multi–party litigation.  The arithmetic of individual loss must
be totted and tabulated painfully and precisely.  English law recog-
nizes no shortcut to this computation.  Furthermore, a fundamental
and general limitation of awarding damages in England is that puni-
tive or non–compensatory damages are not available for a breach of
contract or for the tort of negligence.19  This limitation constitutes a
brake upon proliferation of damages claims in representative pro-
ceedings.
As for compensatory damages, slight progress occurred in 1981
when a Chancery judge held that the representative claimant can estab-
lish a common basis of liability, which can be adopted by others simi-
larly harmed by the defendant.20  This involves a two–stage procedure:
first, the claimant must make a declaration of entitlement to relief
within the main action; then, the represented persons must invoke this
declaration in secondary proceedings when proving their personal loss
and seeking damages.  This development was acknowledged by Profes-
sor Jolowicz.
[T]he idea that there can be a representative action for a declara-
tion that members of a class are entitled to damages, an idea which
does not have the corollary that there may actually be a representa-
tive action for damages, is capable of helping to solve some of the
problems that are raised by multitudinous small claims of similar
character while avoiding the obnoxious features, and especially the
“punitive” character, of the American massive class action.  It
opens the door to an economical procedure for dealing with ques-
tions of liability without at the same time involving the risk that the
18. See id.
19. See generally LAW COMMISSION REPORT NO. 247, AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND
RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, HC 346 (1997) (U.K.).
20. See Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman Indus. Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 339 (Ch. 1980), appeal
granted in part, 2 W.L.R. 31 (C.A. 1982) (Eng.). The Court of Appeal did not disturb the prior
judge’s analysis of the scope of representative proceedings.  The appeal was allowed for other rea-
sons.
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defendant is ordered to pay damages to or for the account of those
who do not seek them.21
However, the 1981 decision has not stimulated much new litigation.
The explanation, it seems, is that the two–stage nature of this procedure
requires represented persons to take the initiative by following up on
the initial decision; damages are not awarded on a plate. Another factor,
perhaps the main one, is that potential representative claimants have
been wary of incurring costs when the outcome of the case is uncertain.
Claimants fear that they might be fully liable for the other side’s costs
without the guarantee of financial contribution by the represented par-
ties.  The question of costs in representative proceedings is briefly dis-
cussed in Section II.F below.  This topic has yet to be fully illuminated
by the courts.
2. Damages at the Representative Stage When Total Liability
Can Be Calculated.  In some unusual cases the two–stage procedure
just mentioned is unnecessary and representative claims for damages
require only a single–stage or concentrated procedure.  These rare
situations occur when a defendant’s total liability can be calculated
readily and damages divided precisely among class members.  One
example is the representative claim by cargo–owners against a tort-
feasor, which was upheld by the House of Lords in 1947; the court
awarded a global sum in favor of the representative party, which the
party would then distribute among the members of the represented
class.22  There the defendant negligently collided with a ship carrying
cargo, and cargo owners sued using a representative claim, claiming
entitlement to reimbursement of their “general average contribu-
tion,” which they had made to their shipper.23  Their position was not
complicated by special terms or defenses in the contracts of carriage.
Each cargo–owner had suffered loss equal to the amount of the gen-
eral average contribution, and the representative party calculated the
damages for the total amount of loss and entered a schedule of these
amounts.24  Therefore, the court could choose to enter a judgment re-
21. J. A. Jolowicz, Comment, Representative Actions, Class Actions and Damages—A
Compromise Solution, 39 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 237, 239 (1980).
22. See Morrison Steamship Co. v. Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on S.S. Greystoke Castle, 1
All E.R. 696 (H.L. 1947) (Eng.).
23. See Owners of Cargo on the Greystoke Castle v. Owners of the Cheldale, 1 All E.R. 177,
179 (C.A. 1945) (Eng.), cited with approval in Smith v. Cardiff Corp., 2 All E.R. 1373 (1954) (Eng.).
The judgment of Evershed M. R. in Smith is an example of how damages can be awarded in a repre-
sentative claim.
24. See Owners of Cargo on the Greystoke Castle, 1 All E.R. at 179.
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flecting these individual interests, or a global amount of contribution
could be awarded as damages, which the representative would be
obliged, as trustee of a fund, to distribute among the class members
(the cargo–owners).25
A 1981 decision presents another permutation.26  This claim con-
cerned a breach of copyright in musical recordings.27  The defendant was
selling goods retail in London markets, and was caught dealing in items
(records, tapes, etc.) which infringed upon a host of interested parties’
rights.28  Because an award of individual damages would have required
inquiry by a Master, subsequent to the main judgment assessing the
precise amount of the loss, damages were awarded on a representative
basis.29  The relevant class of interested musicians and recording compa-
nies had agreed that their damages should be paid to their professional
watch–body to meet the costs of similar actions.30
3. Pecuniary Relief Against Sets of Wrongdoers or Debtors.
The Court of Appeal in 1991 upheld a representative claim brought
against a large consortium of insurers who had agreed to bear a risk
under separate contracts of insurance.31  They had contracted among
themselves that they would be represented by a named underwriter
for the purpose of settling any claim relating to this insurance ar-
rangement.32  At least seven factors justified procedural representa-
tion in this case: (1) the amount of the insurers’ liability could be cal-
culated in advance; (2) it was unlikely that any represented party
might wish to challenge the amount of any award; (3) the consortium
had agreed to be led by a named underwriter; (4) representation
would not be prejudicial to that consortium; (5) individual defendants
would receive notice of the proceedings; (6) a represented party could
apply to be excluded from the class and so become a co–defendant if
he wished to dissociate himself from this representation; (7) the court
25. See id.
26. See E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Riley, 1 W.L.R. 923 (Ch. 1981) (Eng.).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 926.
30. See id.
31. See Irish Shipping Ltd. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 3 All E.R. 853 (1991) (Eng.);
see also R. M. Merkin, Comment, Multi–Party Insurances and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 L.M.C.L.Q.
389; Neil Andrews, Comment, Representative Actions Against Numerous Defendants, 49
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 230 (1990).
32. In Bank of America National Trust and Savings Ass’n v. John Joseph Taylor, Waller J
thought that passive representative proceedings for debt recovery or damages could be ordered
even in the absence of such an agreement: vol 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 484, 495 (Q.B. 1992) (Eng.).
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would need to give permission before the judgment could be enforced
against the represented persons.33
A 1992 decision focuses upon the third factor.34  In Bank of Amer-
ica National Trust and Savings Association v. John Joseph Taylor, the
court held that a monetary claim can be brought against a defendant
who is sued in a representative capacity even if there is no agreement
between the class members (wrongdoers or debtors) authorizing the de-
fendant to litigate or settle claims on their behalf.35
E. Declaratory Relief in a Representative Action
In 2000, the House of Lords heard an appeal in a representative ac-
tion brought by a policy–holder representing 90,000 other policy–hold-
ers.36  The representative sought relief in the form of a declaration that
the defendant life insurance company had been acting unlawfully by
denying to one category of policy holders the same rights as those en-
joyed by another category.37  The proceedings were in fact paid for by
the defendant, who showed a clear interest in achieving a final declara-
tion of the legal position, which would bind all interested parties.38  The
House and the courts below were content for this litigation to proceed
in representative form.  The case is a vivid example of a defendant
gaining the benefit of “closure” by responding to a single representative
action in which a multiplicity of interested parties’ claims can be con-
veniently considered.39  It is no wonder, therefore, that the defendant
was content to fund this efficient form of proceedings.40  Of course, de-
claratory relief is especially amenable to representative proceedings be-
cause there is no pecuniary or other positive order made after judgment,
and because the decision is self–executing.
F. Costs and Representative Proceedings
It is probable that the English courts will be able to apply the costs
rules to achieve an equitable distribution of the cost burden involved in
representative proceedings.  This will require the beneficiary of an ac-
33. The now–applicable rule, CIV. P. R. 19.6(4), makes explicit this last proposition.
34. See Bank of America, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 493-94; see also David Kell, Comment, Evolution
of Representative Actions, 1993 L.M.C.L.Q. 306, 306-309.
35. See 1 Lloyd’s Rep. at 493-94.
36. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Hyman, 3 W.L.R. 529 (H.L. 2000) (Eng.).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
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tive claim to be liable for a proportionate contribution to costs incurred
by the representative.41  The courts have yet to provide guidance re-
garding how they will exercise their discretion in making such costs
awards in this context.  As suggested above, that cloudiness is a strong
disincentive against bringing representative proceedings.
III.  CONSOLIDATION
An additional form of multi–party procedure combines related
claims or defenses in the interests of efficiency.42  The rules boldly de-
clare that, in principle, “[a]ny number of claimants or defendants may
be joined as parties to a claim.”43  Conversely, the court can split up
claims which cannot be conveniently managed within a single case.44
The court may “stay the whole or part of any proceedings . . . either
generally or until a specified date or event.”45
The process of joinder of actions can generate actions involving
thousands of claimants.  For example, the House of Lords in 2000 al-
lowed an English action to proceed in which over 3,000 claimants
sought damages because they suffered personal injury or were the de-
pendants of victims who had died.46  The House’s decision preliminarily
concerned an interesting issue of forum non conveniens (the appropri-
ateness of England as the seat of this litigation).  The claims were made
by a host of individuals residing in South Africa who alleged breach of
duty by an asbestos mining company operated in South Africa by a par-
ent company registered in London.47  The case illustrates the transna-
tional nature, the scale, and the complexity of such mass tort claims.
The action is clearly suitable for treatment under the new 2000 system
of Group Litigation Orders, which will be examined next.
41. See ANDREWS, supra note 14, at ¶ 7-009 (noting especially Judge Waller’s opinion in
Bank of America).
42. See CIV. P. R. 3.1(2)(g) (“[T]he court may . . . consolidate proceedings . . . .”).
43. CIV. P. R. 19.1.
44. See CIV. P. R. 19.2(3) (“The court may order any person to cease to be a party if it is not
desirable for that person to be a party to the proceedings.”).
45. CIV. P. R. 3.1(2)(f).
46. See Lubbe v. Cape PLC, 1 W.L.R. 1545 (H.L. 2000) (Eng.).
47. See id.
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IV.  GROUP ACTIONS
A. Introduction
England now accommodates most multi–party litigation within the
group action procedural category.  This category is governed by a new
code of rules contained in Section III of the Civil Procedure Rules.48  Al-
though this set of rules has been substantially revised over time, the
process of group litigation has been recognized in England for many
years.49  The essence of a group action includes a set of parties (normally
claimants, but they might be defendants) shepherded into a single flock,
travelling the long road to settlement without the separate considera-
tion of a multiplicity of identical or similar issues.  It is a compact form
of macro–justice because it allows common issues to be decided effi-
ciently, consistently, with finality, with an equitable allocation of re-
sponsibility for costs, and with due speed.
B. Group Litigation Orders: The 2000 Procedure
Amendments to the 1998 Civil Procedure Rules were made in
2000, implementing the reform of group actions.50  The new rules are
contained in Civil Procedure Rules Part 19, Section III,51 and in a Prac-
tice Direction entitled Group Litigation.52  The essence of the 2000 pro-
cedure is that the court delineates a cluster of claims as appropriate for
a group litigation order.  Such an order provides for “the case manage-
ment of claims which give rise to common or related issues of fact or law
(the ‘GLO issues’).”53
The procedures require a solicitor acting for a proposed party to a
group litigation case to “consult the Law Society’s Multi–Party Action
Information Service” and obtain information about other cases which
might give rise to a proposed group action.54  Interested solicitors are
48. See CIV. P. R. 19.0.10–19.15.
49. See ANDREWS, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 7-017–7-018 (referring to the multi–party litigation
system up until the mid–1990s).
50. See generally LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MULTI–
PARTY SITUATIONS: PROPOSED NEW PROCEDURES (1997); LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT 223-48 (June 1996); SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION REPORT NO. 154,
FINAL REPORT ON MULTI–PARTY ACTIONS, 1996, Cmnd. 3291.
51. See CIV. P. R. 19.0.10–19.15.
52. See CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES PRACTICE DIRECTION [P. D.] 19 (U.K.).
53. CIV. P. R. 19.10.
54. P. D. 19BPD-003.
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expected to form a Solicitors’ Group.  The group chooses one solicitor
to run both the application process and the eventual case. 55
C. Consideration of the Application
An application for a group litigation order, or official permission to
conduct such proceedings, will be considered by a judge.56  This will be
the more common form of commencement.  The court itself can also
create a group litigation order of its own motion.57  But, whether the ini-
tiative for such an order comes from a party or from the court, no such
order will become definitive without the consent of the Lord Chief Jus-
tice, in the case of proceedings in the Chancery Division, or without the
consent of the Vice–Chancellor in a county court.58
D. Constituting the Group Claim
The court’s first task is to identify the so–called group litigation or-
der issues, i.e., the questions of fact or law which are related.59  The or-
der will specify a management court that will run the case.60  Claims al-
ready pending that fall within the scope of the group action shall be
transferred to the control of the management court and may be entered
on the group register.61  The order will also prescribe related future
claims which will join the same group action.62  To facilitate this, the or-
der will contain directions for publicizing the relevant order.63
E. Case Management in Group Litigation
Different judges can be responsible for managing various facets of
the litigation.64  Thus, substantive issues will always be handled by the
managing judge, but he might need assistance.  The rules provide for the
additional appointment of a Master or District Judge to consider proce-
dural matters, and for the appointment of a specialist costs judge.65  The
55. See id. at 19BPD-005.
56. See id. at 19 3.5-3.6.
57. See id. at 19BPD-016.
58. See id. at 19BPD-011(3.3).
59. See CIV. P. R. 19.10, 19.11(1) & 19.11(2)(b).
60. See CIV. P. R. 19.11(2)(c).
61. See CIV. P. R. 19.11(3)(a).
62. See id. at 19.11(3)(b).
63. See id. at 19.11(3)(c).  In addition to publication under 19.11(3)(c), a copy of a group litiga-
tion order must be sent to the Law Society and to the Senior Master.  See P. D. 19B-029.
64. See P. D. 19BPD-023.
65. See id.
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need to contemplate a judicial team reflects the complexity of large
group actions.  The early involvement of a costs judge is an enlightened
and beneficial innovation.  When the costs stakes are high, sometimes
astronomical, much time, expense, and anxiety can be saved by a cost
judge’s intervention ab initio.  The management court can then issue
various directions.  For example, the court may specify the details to be
included in a statement of the case, and these specifications will serve as
criteria for entering claims on the group register.66  The court can also
nominate one or more claims on the group register to proceed as test
claims.67
F. The Group Register
Those wishing to join and take advantage of group litigation under
the 2000 rules must either affirmatively register as parties to the rele-
vant claim,68 or at least have their particular claims adjoined by judicial
consolidation to the group action.69  Therefore, group actions involve
positive opting–in, or at least a positive decision to litigate.  This con-
trasts with representative proceedings where no such positive decision is
necessary.70  Representative proceedings can effectively take place be-
hind the backs of class members without their knowledge, participation,
or control.  The management court will also specify a date after which
no claim may be added to the group register.71
G. Binding Effect of Orders and Judgments
A decision made with respect to a Group Litigation Order issue
provisionally binds all parties on the group register at the time the deci-
sion is given, unless the court orders otherwise;72 late–comers are also
bound.73  A party who is adversely affected by a judgment or order can
seek permission to appeal.74
66. See CIV. P. R. 19.13(d).
67. See id. at 19.13(b).
68. See id. at 19.11(2)(a), (3)(b), 19.12(1)(3), 19.14.
69. See id. at 19.11(3)(a)(i)&(iii), 19.11(3)(b), 19.13(f).
70. See discussion supra Section II.C.3.
71. See P. D. 19BPD-034.
72. See CIV. P. R. 19.12(1)(a).
73. In the case of claims subsequently entered on the register, “[t]he court may give direc-
tions as to the extent to which that judgment or order is binding.” CIV. P. R. 19.12(1)(b).  An
aggrieved late claimant cannot appeal against the relevant judgment or order, but must instead
“apply to the court for an order that the judgment or order is not binding on him.”  Id. at
19.12(3).
74. See id. at 19.12(2).
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H. Test Claims
When a claim is singled out to form a test claim, decisions in that
case are binding on all similar claims on the group register.  The result
of the test claim can also bind subsequent claims added to the register, if
the court so directs.75
I. Costs
A new costs rule was issued in June 2000 to complement the group
action system.76  The rule distinguishes between common costs and indi-
vidual costs.  Where an application or hearing deals with both common
issues relating to the group and individual issues affecting only particu-
lar parties, the court will declare the proportions of the costs attribut-
able to common costs and to individual costs.77
The essence of the new costs rule is that group litigants will nor-
mally be subject to an “order for common costs” which will impose “on
each group litigant several liability for an equal proportion of those
common costs.”78  It should be noted that the basic English costs rule,
which permeates all forms of civil litigation, is that the “loser pays.”
The 1998 Civil Procedure Rules reaffirm that “the general rule is that
the unsuccessful party will be ordered to pay the costs of the successful
party,” and this rule applies to all forms of civil proceedings, not just
multi–party litigation.79  In England, the cost–shifting rule is said to be
not only an aspect of elementary fairness between litigants but consis-
tent with public policy, because it deters ill–considered or malevolent
claims and defenses and encourages settlement.80  It has this effect by
applying obvious and considerable pressure to both parties to avoid the
double risk of becoming liable for the other side’s costs in the event of
the latter’s victory, as well as bearing their own legal costs.
Consistent with the basic costs rule, members of a group claim will
incur liability for the opponent’s costs if the group loses the action.
Group members’ costs liability to the victorious opponent might be
75. See CIV. P. R. 19.12(1).
76. See id. at 48.6A.
77. See id. at 48.6A(5).
78. CIV. P. R. 48.6A(3).
79. Id. at 44.3(2)(a).
80. See Condliffe v. Hislop, 1 W.L.R. 753, 762 (C.A. 1996) (Eng.); AEI Rediffusion Music Ltd.
v. Phonographic Performance Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 1507, 1516 (C.A. 1999) (Eng.) (citing Roache v. News
Group Newspapers Ltd., 1998 E.M.L.R. 161 (C.A. 1992) (Eng.)); see also R v. Lord Chancellor ex
parte Child Poverty Action Group, 1 W.L.R. 347, 356 (Q.B. 1999) (Eng.).
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comprised of two elements.81  First, a group litigant’s liability with re-
spect to other members of the group will be “an equal proportion, to-
gether with all the other group litigants, of the common costs.”82  For
example, suppose a thousand group litigants bring a claim against the
defendant, judgment is awarded for the defendant, and the case con-
cludes.  Each of the thousand group litigants will be liable to the defen-
dant for an equal part of the total common costs owed to the defendant
by the group.  The second and additional element of costs payable by an
individual group litigant is the amount of individual costs incurred by
the defendant in meeting that particular litigant’s claim.83  This could in-
clude expenses incurred by the defendant when demonstrating that a
particular claimant had not suffered the loss alleged.
V.  APPRAISAL OF ENGLISH STYLES OF MULTI–PARTY
LITIGATION
The enactment in 2000 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Part 19 Sec-
tion III, makes plain that the architects and custodians of English civil
justice prefer that multi–party litigations should proceed as group ac-
tions rather than as representative proceedings.84  Furthermore, most
multi–party traffic already takes the group action route because the rep-
resentative action does not generally allow damages to be awarded at
large in favor of a class.  As discussion in Section II.D.2, the court can
award damages in a representative action only where (i) the class mem-
bers’ loss can be readily ascertained at the time of judgment; or (ii) the
class members have waived their rights to individual receipt of damages
and instead wish their compensation to be paid to a body enjoying care
of their interests.85  Note that even in this last situation, however, the
damages must be worked out.86
A contingency of non–English commentators at the conference
suggested that the English preference for group litigation orders, rather
than class actions on the representative model, diminishes the chances
of victims of mass wrongs to gain effective access to justice.  Some critics
went further and suggested that the English system is pusillanimous for
failing to commit itself to recovery of damages in class actions.  In re-
sponse to these comments, I will address the fundamental question, a
81. See CIV. P. R. at 48.6A(4).
82. Id. at 48.6(A)(4)(b).
83. See id. at 48.6A(4)(a).
84. See CIV. P. R. 19.0.10–19.15; discussion supra Section IV.
85. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
86. See id.
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delicate issue of policy and fairness: whether in English multi–party ac-
tions it is right to prefer as the primary style of procedure a case–man-
aged group litigation rather than representative style actions (known
elsewhere as class actions).  Ultimately, this question involves a political
judgment that requires a choice between imponderable merits and de-
merits.  The following factors need to be weighed in the balance of this
inquiry.  Many of these factors were addressed in the course of the spir-
ited discussion at the Geneva conference in 2000.
A. Some Advantages of Representative Claims
1. Efficiency.  English representative proceedings can effi-
ciently render all class members subject to the court’s relief without
being identified and notified, and without making a positive election
to join the litigation.87  Procedural costs are therefore reduced.
2. Access to Justice.  Three points are of importance with this
advantage.  First, representative actions can promote better access to
justice than group litigation because the latter requires positive steps
to be taken by the alleged victim of a legal wrong.88  Secondly, repre-
sentative proceedings enable rights to be vindicated that cannot read-
ily be enforced by individual action.  Thirdly, the class action is a
means of redressing procedural inequality between small claimants
and large defendants.
3. Equality of Treatment.  Representative actions embrace a
whole class of interested persons and so ensure a fair and equal allo-
cation of rights or burdens.89
4. Finality or Closure.  The representative action achieves fi-
nality of outcome or closure.  Defendants prize closure because it en-
ables them to draw a line under a particular tragedy, series of mis-
haps, or a set of related consumer grievances.90
5. Effectiveness in Vindicating Civil Rights.  The representative
action can be more potent than other forms of multi–party litigation.
It can increase the effectiveness of the civil law’s vindication of rights
and interests, especially when combined with generous costs provi-
sions, such as conditional fee schemes91 or even the discretionary sus-
87. See discussion supra Section. II.C (contrasting representative proceedings with Group
Litigation where positive opting–in is necessary); see also supra Section IV.F.
88. See supra notes 68-70.
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pension of the ordinary costs rule that the loser pays the other side’s
costs.92
B. Disadvantages of Representative Proceedings
1. Failure to Particularize Relevant Distinctions.  This concerns
the danger of superficial adjudication.  Representative proceedings
can cause injustice if the action steamrolls over relevant differences
between individual claims or defenses.  To avoid this, the court must
be alert to ensure that salient differences are teased out during the
litigation.
2. Counterproductive Speed.  There is a related danger of mis-
placed procedural haste.  Representative proceedings might not con-
clude the entire matter but merely scratch the surface of a myriad of
detailed disputes.  It may prove necessary to pursue secondary litiga-
tion to achieve precision in individual cases.  This can cause avoidable
delay and expense.  In some situations, it is better for there to be a
measure of procedural discipline and for each claim to be carefully
pleaded and registered as part of a group action.  This allows the
court to consider both common issues and individual divergences
from that common ground within the same action.
89. See ANDREWS,  supra note 13, ¶¶ 7-023–7-024.
90. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing when a representative action on be-
half of 90,000 was funded by defendant life insurance company).
91. See Neil H. Andrews, Comment, Conditional Fee Agreements: The Courts and Parliament
in Union, 57 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 469 (1998); Neil H. Andrews, Comment, Common Law Invalidity of
Conditional Fee Agreements for Litigation: “U Turn” in the Court of Appeal, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
265 (2000) (describing the “no win, no fee” system, with or without an additional bonus for the law-
yer to reward success in the litigation).  The statutory provisions prescribing valid fee agreements are
“§58 and §58A of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (substituted by section 27 of the Access to
Justice Act 1999 and effective from April 1, 2000),” the Conditional Fee Agreements Regulations
2000, (S.I. 2000, No. 692) (revoking the 1995 regulations (S.I. 1995, No. 1675)), and the Conditional
Fee Agreements Order 1998 (S.I. 1998, No. 1860).  Id. at 265.
92. See R v. Lord Chancellor, 1 W.L.R. 347 (C.A. 1999) (Eng.) (affirming jurisdiction to make
an order prior to trial to protect applicant against liability for costs); McDonald v. Horn, 1 All E.R.
961 (C.A. 1995) (Eng.) (noting that courts are reluctant to make such pre–trial cost orders except in
favor of trustees and related officers such as executors, receivers, liquidators, and minority share-
holders); see also Wilkinson v. Neary, 1 W.L.R. 1220 (Ch. 1995) (Eng.); Re Biddencare Ltd., 2
B.C.L.C. 160 (Ch. 1994) (Eng.).
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3. Problems of Due Process.  Representative proceedings noto-
riously can violate people’s legitimate interests in receiving due proc-
ess, namely in receiving due notice of the claim, having their dispute
properly articulated, and enjoying an opportunity to state their case.
4. The Danger of Collective Bullying.  One objection to repre-
sentative or class actions is that they have a tendency in extreme cases
to coerce even large companies into settling rather than fighting a
case on the merits.93  Wearing his hat as captain of a tribe, it becomes
easier for David to smite Goliath.  But in principle, group litigation
can raise the same problem of intimidation, except that the group
members stand shoulder to shoulder on the battlefield.  Perhaps the
difference between group litigation and class actions is that there is a
lesser chance of the former being used as an errant form of coercing a
settlement whether or not the case is meritorious.  This result occurs
because group litigants must register and individually plead their
claims and because they are severally liable for common costs.94  By
contrast, class members in representative proceedings can be spectral
and the merits of their claims wholly speculative.
C. Assessment
Ultimately, it is uncertain whether group actions are less likely to
involve procedural bullying.  The remaining three disadvantages to rep-
resentative claims are more solid and exhibit why group litigation is a
more beneficial style of litigation.  What emerges from these lists of
merits and demerits is that it is no easy matter to decide whether one
style of multi–party procedure is superior to another.  The English pref-
erence for group litigation orders is not transparently wrong, nor is it
self–evidently right.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The English legal system is more circumspect than many other sys-
tems in recognizing new legal techniques and concepts.  More recently
there have been signs of a greater willingness among the senior judges
to innovate and to take slightly bolder steps when developing the law.95
For several decades judicial innovation seemed to be monopolized by
93. This was an observation made by several defense attorneys at the conference in July 2000.
94. See supra Section IV.I.
95. See Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Lincoln City Council, 3 W.L.R. 1095 (H.L. 1998) (Eng.)
(abolishing in a bold decision the 200–year mistake of law ban upon restitutionary claims for the re-
covery of mistaken payments).
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Lord Denning, whose judgments in the Court of Appeal often came
crashing to the ground on further appeal to the House of Lords.96  A
more positive way of making this point is to say that the English legal
system is famous for its pragmatic approach to change.97
Lord Steyn, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary who is a conspicuously
innovative judge, but also a shrewd pragmatist, kindly chaired the
common law section of the Geneva conference (English, Canadian, and
Australian reporters) and made some interesting observations.  He sug-
gested that English senior judges are opposed to a litigious society, that
is, an over–excited tendency for citizens and businessmen to “blame and
claim” by bringing actions in the ordinary courts rather than pursuing
grievance procedures through political systems of democratic account-
ability, pressure groups, ombudsmen, arbitration, conciliation, etc.98
Nor, he suggested, were these judges guilty of applying an oligarchic
brake in the litigation process.99  Instead, he said this view reflected a
sense, which is widely shared within the community, of the place of civil
law and of its relationship to the other organs of political and social
life.100
Against this background, it is perhaps not complacent to say that
the newly refined 2000 model of group litigation orders must be allowed
time to prove itself.  If, in five years, the 2000 system turns out to be an
inadequate vehicle for delivering damages to those who deserve com-
pensation, English law reformers will need to consider the experience of
other legal systems.  Many of these legal systems have embraced the
class action and allowed cohorts of potential claimants to receive justice
without participating positively in the action or in the settlement nego-
tiations.
The Author’s main anxiety is that the custodians of English civil
justice have not formally created a mechanism for assessing the success
of group litigation.  Furthermore, one senses that England will do well
to debate actively whether the group litigation procedure is a flexible
and efficient response to the problem of multi–party litigation.  Perhaps
the clamoring voices of potential claimants (or class members) and their
96. See Photo Prod. Ltd. v. Securicor Transp. Ltd., 2 W.L.R. 283 (H.L. 1980) (Eng.); Woodar
Inv. Dev. Ltd. v. Wimpey Constr. U. K. Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 277 (H.L. 1980) (Eng.). The court decided
these cases on February 14, 1980, a St. Valentine’s Day massacre at Westminster.
97. See generally P. S. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW (1987).
98. Lord Steyn, Address at the Conference on Debates Over Group Litigation in Com-
parative Perspectives (July 21-22, 2000).
99. See id.
100. See id.
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lawyers have not been stilled by the recent provisions for group litiga-
tion, nor might the 2000 rules cause the bitter waters of civil contention
to subside.101
In February 2001, the Lord Chancellor’s Department issued a con-
sultation paper, entitled “Representative Claims: Proposed New Proce-
dures.”102  The document is the fruit of a committee’s lengthy delibera-
tions. But the text is tentative and merely sets out a series of options for
possible reform of the law. It is too early to say whether this consulta-
tion paper will proceed further or, if it does progress, what shape even-
tual changes in the law might take. All that can be said now is that this
latest official paper demonstrates that the English governmental
authorities and some parts of the English legal profession see the need
for further legal development of multi-party procedure. The system of
group litigation introduced in 2000, and which has been described in this
paper, might not be the last word on this topic in England.
101. These images echo Lord Simon of Glaisdale’s words in another context, in the Ampthill
Peerage Case.  See Ampthill Peerage Case, 2 W.L.R. 777, 805-06 (H.L. 1977) (Eng.).
102. Lord Chancellor’s Dept. (London, 2001).
